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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TREATIES:
SELF -EXECUTION AND RELATED DOCTRINES
The panel was convened at 9:00 a.m., Saturday, April 1, by its chair, Carlos Vazquez of
Georgetown University Law Center, who introduced the panelists: Robert Dalton of the U.S.
Department of State; Vasan Kesavan of D.B. Zwirn & Co.; and Ann Woolhandler of the
University of Virginia School of Law:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY CARLOS

M.

VAZQUEZ t

This morning we will be discussing the judicial enforcement of treaties in the United
States. In particular, I would like to focus on the relationship between a treaty's status as
self-executing or not, and the question of its judicial enforceability.
The circumstances in which treaties may be enforced in court by individuals arises in three
high-profile cases currently before the Supreme Court. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, an individual
challenges the validity of the military commissions created by the president shortly after the
attacks of September 11, 200 l. 1 He argues that the president's order calling for the creation
of the commissions violates the constitutional separation of powers and the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (with then-Judge John
G. Roberts concurring) held that the individual rights conferred by the Geneva Conventions
were not enforceable in domestic courts. 2 In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on
the proposition that treaties are compacts between nations, typically enforceable through
diplomatic negotiation, not in domestic courts. 3
The other two cases involve the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a concededly
self-executing treaty that provides, inter alia, that nationals of one state party detained by
officials of another state party have a right to be informed without delay that they have a
right to confer with their consul. 4 In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a criminal defendant sought
to suppress a statement he gave to the police before he was notified of his right to communicate
with his consul. The Oregon courts denied the requested relief on the ground that the rights
conferred by the Vienna Convention are not judicially enforceable. s In Bustillo v. Johnson,
a habeas corpus petition was filed by a prisoner who was convicted of murder without ever
having been informed of his right to communicate with his consul. He argues that, if he had
been informed of this right, the consul would have buttressed his argument at trial that the
murder had actually been committed by another Honduran national then living in Virginia. 6
Before the Supreme Court, the U.S. government argues in all three cases that treaties are
generally compacts between nations with which domestic courts have nothing to do. While
acknowledging that treaties may sometimes be judicially enforceable, the Solicitor General
argues that this is a narrow exception to the general rule that treaty disputes are for diplomatic
• Mr. Kesavan did not contribute remarks.
t Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
I See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
3 [d. at 38-40.
4 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Art. 36, Apr. 23, 1963,21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261.
5 State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Or. 267,276-77 (2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005).
6 See Brief of Petitioner, Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51 (Dec. 2005).
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resolution. To fall within the exception, he claims, the treaty must clearly specify that it is
judicially enforceable. 7
The Solicitor General's position is in substantial tension with the constitutional text. Article
VI provides that treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land," and instructs judges to give
them effect. This suggests that judicial enforceability is the rule, and that doctrines that
preclude judicial enforcement are the exception.
Nor is the Solicitor General's position supported by the decisions on which it relies. Taking
a page from John Yoo,8 the Solicitor General relies on Foster v. Nielson for the idea that
treaties are contracts between states, not legislative acts. 9 But the Supreme Court in Foster
was actually making the opposite point. While observing that treaties are not considered to
have legislative effects in other countries, it stressed that
[i]n the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid
of any legislative provision. 10
The Solicitor General, and the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan, also rely on language from Head
Money Cases to the effect that "[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent
nations [which] depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor
of the governments which are parties to it," and accordingly "[w]hen a violation of a treaty
nonetheless occurs, it 'becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations,'
not judicial redress." II But here, too, the Court was referring to the effect of treaties in the
absence of the Supremacy Clause. The Court made it clear that, because of the Supremacy
Clause, treaties that "prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject
may be determined" are to be regarded as equivalent to an act of the legislature, and hence
to be "enforced in a court of justice." 12
Indeed, the Supreme Court made it clear two years later in United States v. Rauscher
that the language from Head Money Cases on which the Solicitor General relies was describing
the effect of treaties in Great Britain, which does not have a Supremacy Clause.13 As the
Court made clear in Rauscher, Head Money Cases addressed "the effect of a treaty as a
part of the law of the land, as distinguished from its aspect as a mere contract between
independent nations." 14 Because treaties are declared by the Constitution to be the supreme
law of the land, the Court emphasized in Rauscher that "the courts are bound to take judicial
notice [of them], and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing
out of [them].,,15

See Brief of Respondents at 30-32, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (Feb. 2006).
See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955,2087 (1999); but cf Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
2154,2193 (1999) (disputing Yoo's claims).
9 Brief of Respondents, supra note 7, at 30.
10 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
II See Brief of Respondents, supra note 7, at 30 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
12 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99. See also Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38-39.
13 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 417 (1886), where the Court made clear that the passages cited
by the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals address the "difference between the judicial powers of the courts
of Great Britain and of this country in regard to treaties."
14 Id. at 418.
15 Id. at 419. See generally Brief of Louis Henkin et al. as Amici Curiae, Hamdan (No. 05-184).
7

8
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Not all treaties are enforceable in court. Historically, a treaty's enforceability in court has
been addressed by courts through the doctrine of self-execution. This is consistent with the
Court's statement in Foster that a self-executing treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature." I have previously written that the concept of a
non-self-executing treaty masks several distinct types of reasons why a treaty might not be
judicially enforceable even though it is the "supreme Law of the Land." 16 But while the
grounds for finding a treaty self-executing might vary, the effect of a finding that a treaty
is self-executing is clear. As the Court made clear in Foster and Head Money Cases, a selfexecuting treaty is enforceable in the courts of justice in the same circumstances as a statute
having the same content.
A party relying on a self-executing treaty might still lose. For example, he might lose
because the treaty does not confer a private right of action. But a private right of action is
not necessary if the party invokes the treaty defensively, or pursuant to a right of action
conferred by another law. 17 This is the case in Sanchez-Llamas, where the treaty was invoked
by a criminal defendant, and in Hamdan and Bustillo, in which the treaty was invoked by
a habeas petitioner. ls The party invoking the treaty might also lose because the treaty does
not support the remedy he seeks. Thus, the Court might find that the Vienna Convention
does not support the suppression of a statement given before consular notification is given.
But the fact that a treaty is self-executing does rule out one basis for denying relief to a
party relying on the treaty. It rules out the conclusion that the treaty is not judicially enforceable
because it is a contract between states that is for diplomatic enforcement only. If a treaty is
self-executing, it is to be treated like an act of legislation. It should therefore not be denied
enforcement because it is "merely" a compact between states.
REMARKS BY ROBERT

E.

DALTON *

My remarks focus on three aspects of the subject that the panel has been asked to address.
Since I have had the privilege of working on a broad range of issues relating to U.S. treaties,
including many of the issues being examined by this panel, those remarks will draw more
on practice than on theory.
The first is the need to agree on a new vocabulary of legal terms to denote each of the
possible meanings of the term' 'self-executing." Establishment and use of this new taxonomy
should permit more precise discussion of various aspects of self-execution and help to dispel
some of the confusion which lawyers, judges, and scholars currently face.
The second part of my remarks examines the judicial enforcement of self-executing provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty to transfer the canal to Panama and to establish private
rights for various individuals-both citizens and aliens.
The third examines the related "last-in-time" rule governing the relationship between
treaties and statutes in the event that there is a conflict between a self-executing treaty and
a statute. While the rule was established by the Supreme Court more than a century ago, it
is being questioned by some scholars. I will examine a recent instance in which the existence
of the rule made it possible to resolve an important foreign policy difference with another
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AJIL 695 (1995).
See id. at 719-22.
18 Even the Court of Appeals in Hamdan recognized that "[tJhe availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner's
need to rely on a private right of action." Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40 (citing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 14041 & n.l6 (2d Cir. 2003» .
• Senior Adviser to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State.
16

17
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country and argue that abandonment of the rule would deprive the United States of a valuable
tool that provides it flexibility in resolving issues that arise from time to time in the conduct
of its foreign affairs.
When I fIrst encountered the concept of self-executing treaty, I was urged to read the thenleading article on that topic by Alona Evans. For Professor Evans, there was one meaning
only: a treaty was self-executing if there was no need for legislation to implement the treaty.
Our chairman, in his important 1995 article on the subject, identifIed four doctrines of selfexecuting treaties. l Unfortunately, when one looks at the literature and considers the practice,
it is clear that' 'self-executing" has become an ambiguous term devoid of generally accepted
meaning.
It is often unclear to an American reader which meaning the user had in mind. I am sure
many of you have had the experience, as I have, of encountering the use of the term "selfexecuting" by the same writer in similar contexts but in different senses, and wondering if
the second use was by choice or by chance. The risk of confusion for the foreign readerparticularly one from a dualist legal system who is most likely to understand self-executing
as meaning solely that there is no need for implementing legislation-is very high. Such a
reader is unlikely to know that there are at least three other possible meanings of "selfexecuting" and is likely to be misled if the user had in mind one (or several) of them. The
prescription for a better understanding of the "most confounding" doctrine that we are
examining may well be the development of a cluster group of new legal terms to denote
each meaning of the term that seem to have proliferated in recent years. Such a development
would promote greater clarity of discussion and permit the making of intelligible distinctions
among the possible meanings that have attached themselves like barnacles to a concept that
was once less confounding.
Before leaving this topic, I would like to respond to questions raised by the chairman as
to the frequency with which questions of the self-executing nature of treaties arise in U.S.
practice. A survey of bilateral treaties would, I think, suggest that most are self-executing.
Some of those treaties, especially friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties, provide
individual rights to aliens; cases such as Asakura v. City of Seattie,2 have found them to be
judicially enforceable. Other treaties, such as those in the extradition and prisoner transfer
fIeld, do not require legislation because there are existing statutes that establish a legal
framework for their application. A survey of multilateral treaties might establish a larger
percentage of non-self-executing treaties. This is so because a signifIcant number of multilateral treaties today deal with law enforcement and anti-terrorism. Treaties in those fIelds often
require criminalization of conduct that falls within the legislative powers of Congress. Treaties
regulating intellectual or industrial property, too, are likely to require implementing legislation. On the other hand, treaties providing a uniform system of rights and obligations, such
as those in the 1999 Convention for the UnifIcation of Certain Rules for International Carriage
of Passengers and Goods by Air, are often self-executing and will be judicially enforced. 3
The controversy concerning the power of the president and two-thirds of the Senate to
transfer the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama by self-executing provisions of

1 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AlIL 695, 722-23 (1995).
2265 U.S. 332 (1924).
3 The 1999 Convention is the latest of a series of such treaties beginning with the Warsaw Convention of 1929.
Cases under that convention and its progeny have substantially contributed to the development of the rules of treaty
interpretation by U.S. courts.
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an advice and consent treaty was decided by Edwards v. Carter,4 a case brought prior to
the Senate vote by sixty members of the House of Representatives in an attempt to prevent
the proposed transfer. While treaties for the acquisition of territory generally require appropriation of funds and thus a role for the House of Representatives, this transfer by the United
States was of a different character. The provisions relating to the transfer were drafted so .
as to avoid the necessity for the appropriation of funds by the United States. The Senate
subsequently gave its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty by the requisite majority,
and the treaty entered into force on October 1, 1979.
Following the self-executing transfer, Panama granted the United States the right to operate
the canal for a transition period of approximately twenty years. During that period, a number
of appropriations were necessary, and the Congress approved them as part of the Panama
Canal Commission Authorization Act of 1986, and other legislation.
When scholars analyze U.S. treaties, their focus tends to be on the principal elements of
those treaties rather than on subsidiary provisions that may have been essential for the
conclusion and effective execution of those treaties. The Panama Canal Treaty consists of
fourteen articles, an annex, and an agreed minute. 5 In addition, the parties concluded separate
agreements on the implementation of Articles III and IV of the treaty dealing, respectively,
with canal operation and management and with protection and defense of the Canal. These
various documents contain provisions that appear to establish a variety of private rights. For
example, Article X of the treaty itself deals with employment with the Panama Canal
Commission, a new body established by the treaty. Paragraph 7 of Article X provides
preferred placement rights in other U.S. govemmentjobs for persons employed by the Panama
Canal Company prior to the entry into force of the treaty who are displaced from their
employment as a result of the discontinuance by the United States of certain activities
pursuant to the treaty. Paragraph 10 provides for optional early retirement benefits for
those employees and obligates the United States to seek special legislation for more liberal
entitlement to, and calculation of, retirement annuities than were currently provided for them.
Article XV of the Agreement Pursuant to Article III of the Canal Treaty provides tax
exemption for U.S. citizen employees and dependents as a result of their work for the
Commission. Although the Agreement pursuant to Article III is an executive agreement
pursuant to a treaty, some of the persons mentioned sued for a refund of all federal income
tax paid on income derived from their employment with the Commission. 6
Additional provisions relating to private rights, including at least one provision pertaining
to Panamanians, might be gleaned from the Panama Canal Treaty and its related documents,
but that seems unnecessary within the context of this synopsis. The purpose of highlighting
provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty that establish private rights and appear not to require
implementing legislation is to suggest that we may be underestimating the extent to which
private rights are contained in provisions of U.S. treaties. The literature has tended to focus
on non-self-executing declarations included by the Senate in its resolutions of advice and
consent to human rights treaties. More comprehensive research into the texts of U.S. treaties
might identify additional provisions that could be examined in connection with further
discussion of the broader issue.
4580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978), een. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
5 33 UST 39, TlAS 10030.
6 Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 115, 123, rev'd, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), ajf'd, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).
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The final section relates to the later-in-time or last-in-time rule. The rule provides that if
there is a conflict between a self-executing treaty and a statute, the courts as a matter of
domestic law will apply the later-in-time. The rationale for the rule generally begins with
the statement that treaties and laws of the United States are both the supreme law of the
land under Article VI of the Constitution. As a result, the statement continues, if the conflict
cannot be resolved, then the courts will apply the later one.
Typically it is the statute that is inconsistent with an earlier treaty.7 But in United States
v. The Schooner Peggy,S the Supreme Court held that insofar as a treaty operates of its own
force as municipal law, it supersedes a prior inconsistent act of Congress. And in Charlton
v. Kelly the Supreme Court observed "Of course, the effect of the supplementary treaty of
1884, being later than the statutory requirements ... , is to supersede the statute insofar as
there is a necessary conflict in the carrying out of the extradition obligation between this
country and Italy." 9
Although the rule has been generally accepted for more than two hundred years and
recently affIrmed by the Supreme Court, some international lawyers are uncomfortable with
it. In addition, several academics have recently expressed the view that the premise for the
rule is flawed-that Article VI of the Constitution does not give equal status to statutes and
treaties. Yet the rule is not without its defenders. Professor Rodgers finds that the rule
"reflects a general and appropriate restraint on the part of the courts to avoid getting
involved in the interplay between the law making power of the Treaty Makers and that of
Congress .... When two valid legislative acts-a statute and a self-executing treaty provision-are interpreted to conflict with each other, the courts are ... in no position to decide
which is preferable. The only alternative is to apply the most recent enactment of a federal
body having the power to legislate, whether it is the Congress or the Treaty-Makers.,,10
In contrast to the largely theoretical concerns of some academics as to the basis for the
rule, substantial practical consequences would flow from its abolition since the United States
would no longer have the possibility of negotiating a treaty excepting a particular country
from application of a statute that the Congress would be unwilling to repeal in its entirety.
The value of this existing foreign policy tool is illustrated by the conclusion of the treaty
between the United States and Iceland to facilitate their defense relationship, signed at New
York on September 24, 1986Y
Under the 1951 United States-Iceland Defense Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty, the United States and Iceland had long maintained arrangements for the use of defense
facilities in Iceland. For approximately fourteen years prior to 1984, Icelandic vessels had
carried all the cargos to and from the military base there. Following the initiation of regular
service to and from Iceland by a newly formed U.S. flag carrier in 1984, the Department of
Defense shipped cargo for the base at Keflavik on the U.S. carrier to the extent of its
availability, as required by applicable U.S. cargo preference laws. This shift sharply reduced
the transportation of military cargo on Icelandic shipping lines.
In light of Iceland's position that failure to resolve the matter could adversely affect the
long-term defense relationship between the United States and Iceland, the two countries
opened negotiations that led to the conclusion of the 1986 treaty. An implementing agreement,
7 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
85 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
9229 U.S. 447, 463 (1913).
IO 1. N. RODGERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
II T.I.A.S. 1l098, 2120 UNTS 109.

UNITED STATES LAW

90 (1999).
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in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, provides specific details as to how awards
for the carriage of such cargo are to be allocated following the receipt of bids from carriers
of both countries.
Rather than relying generally on the last-in-time rule, the parties incorporated in the text
a specific article (Article IV) to supersede application of cargo preference laws, principally
the U.S. 1904 Cargo Preference Act, to the treaty. That article reads as follows: "The
provisions of this Treaty and any implementing arrangements concluded pursuant to Article
I shall apply notwithstanding any prior inconsistent law or regulation of the United States
of America or the Republic of Iceland."
Since the provision in Article IV may be unique in U.S. practice, a legitimate question is
why it was thought necessary. There was substantial concern throughout the maritime community that, notwithstanding the national security interests that the treaty was designed to
promote, the exception to application of the Cargo Preference Act to military shipments to
Iceland could lead to pressure for similar exceptions for other countries and a weakening of
the act. Taking this concern into account, the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the treaty recommended that the Senate advise and consent to ratification only with
specified assurances of the State and Defense Departments, the most important of which
seems to have been that the treaty would not be understood as, or appear to be a precedent
for, similar weakening of the 1904 Cargo Preference Act in other trades. 12 Such assurances
were given at the Committee hearing held on September 30, 1986. 13
I very much appreciate having heard the views of other members of the panel and look
forward to answering any questions my remarks may have prompted. As suggested by my
comments concerning the last-in-time rule, I take the view that treaties and statutes are of
equal dignity as the supreme law of the land. I therefore do not share the views of those
who consider treaties to be of lesser dignity and would give them less consequence.
REMARKS BY ANN WOOLHANDLER*

Discussion of the issue of self-execution begins with the Supremacy Clause, which makes
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States the supreme law of the land. Based
on this provision, Carlos Vazquez and many other international law scholars argue that
treaties should ordinarily be understood as establishing rules of decision for American courts
even in the absence of implementing legislation. Otherwise, they claim, courts would be
treating treaties less favorably than the other forms of law mentioned in the Supremacy
Clause. While treaty maximalists discuss the matter as if they merely wanted treaties to be
put on an equal footing with the Constitution and laws, they seem at times to want treaties
to be as presumptively enforceable as the United States Constitution, and treated more
favorably than federal statutes.
On the other hand, some scholars maintain that treaties should indeed receive less favorable
treatment than the other categories of federal law. For example, John Yoo has argued that
treaties covering matters within Congress's Article I powers should always be non-selfexecuting. More moderately, our panelist Vasan Kesavan has argued that treaty provisions
should not be self-executing if they conflict with an earlier-in-time federal statute.

12

S.

13

Id.

EXEC.

REp. 99-27,3 (1986).

• Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
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TREATING TREATIES LESS FAVORABLY THAN STATUTES

Although Vasan claims that courts have generally applied the last-in-time rule to let federal
statutes trump treaties, rather than vice versa, there may possibly be more instances of
treaties' trumping federal statutes than he has noted. For example, in the Schooner Peggy
case,l a treaty with France appears to have trumped a claim pending on appeal for forfeiture
of a French vessel under a federal statute. Perhaps Schooner Peggy falls within Vasan's
treaty-of-peace exception to his general claim that treaties do not trump preexisting statutes,
but that exception does seem to put a bit of a hole in his statutory priority claim.
But even if there may possibly be a few more instances of treaties' trumping federal
statutes out there, Vasan's theory has some things going for it. As a descriptive matter, it
coincides with Tim Wu' s conclusion that treaties are rarely found to be self-executing in
areas where there are detailed congressional statutes already in existence (as there are with
respect to intellectual property and tariffs, for instance). For Tim, this is in line with his
theory that the courts' finding a treaty self-executing to a large extent depends on who
breaches the treaty.
Perhaps another way to characterize the phenomenon that treaties conflicting with preexisting federal statutes are unlikely to be deemed self-executing is to say that treaties that are
too discordant with domestic regimes of judicially enforceable rights and remedies are less
likely to be found enforceable. This reason may have more to do with presumptions about
ratifiers' intent than with constitutional limitations on treaties' efficacy. But it does seem to
be true that when a treaty creates novel rights beyond those that are currently domestically
enforced or creates remedies that seem disproportionate to the violation, it is less likely to
be judicially enforced.
Thus the historical paradigm of the self-executing treaty fit easily into domestic rights and
remedies regimes. Historically, the treaty most likely to be considered self-executing was
one giving aliens the same privileges and immunities as citizens-that is, rights to have
one's contracts enforced, rights to own land and not have it confiscated, and rights to inherit
and engage in the common occupations. To apply these treaties, the federal courts merely
had to look to rights that already existed for citizens under state law, as they did when
applying Article IV's interstate privileges and immunities clause for out-of-staters, or to the
rights they enforced under the Contracts Clause.
One can contrast treaties giving aliens the same rights and remedies as citizens, with
treaties adding rights and remedies, whether it be intellectual property treaties, or human
rights treaties claimed to supplement constitutional protections for citizens and aliens alike.
Thus, while I would not go so far as Vasan to say that the existence of federal statutes
necessarily makes a treaty non-self-executing, I might as a practical matter often end up in
the same place. When one seeks to ascertain the ratifiers' likely intent, the discordance of
treaties with domestic regimes of rights and remedies may be a factor in determining that a
treaty is non-self-executing.
TREATING TREATIES BETTER THAN STATUTES

While Vasan would let earlier statutes trump later treaties, treaty maximalists like Carlos
sometimes seem to want treaties to operate as if they were of constitutional rather than
statutory status. For example: (1) some would entertain a very strong presumption that treaties
I

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (I801).
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provide law to be applied by the courts; (2) some argue for ignoring domestic treaty ratifiers'
intent, and are thus hostile to reservations, even though statutory intent remains important
in interpreting domestic statutes; (3) some may favor easy implication of rights of action
along the lines of Bivens, even though implied rights of action have become increasingly
uncommon for domestic statutes; while (4) some seek generous remedies, comparable to
those more routinely given for constitutional than statutory violations.
We can see some of these tendencies at work in the Vienna Convention consular notification
cases currently before the Court, Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo? These cases narrow the selfexecution issues in that (1) the Convention creates duties that at least arguably run from
nations to individuals; and (2) the individuals who want to enforce treaty-created duties are
not seeking an implied right of action, but only enforcement of a treaty right within an
existing cause of action. The treaty maximalists might now argue that the petitioners in these
cases only ask that treaties be enforced to the same extent as domestic federal statuteswhich presumptively provide law to be applied where there is an existing cause of action.
But even should the Court deny relief to the petitioners, the Court would not necessarily
be treating treaties worse than statutes. To say that statutes are presumptively self-executing,
and thus supply law to be applied in the courts, does not tell you who may enforce such
law, in what circumstances, and for what remedies. Consider recent cases addressing when
Section 1983 can be used to enforce federal statutes (as opposed to the Constitution). In
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, the Court held that an individual could not enforce the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act's restrictions on the release of student records. 3 The
Court looked at congressional intent, particularly as evidenced by the language of the statute,
and the alternative executive enforcement remedies therein provided, and determined that
Congress had not intended to create individually judicially enforceable rights.
The inquiry in the treaty cases is similar, as Tim Wu has pointed out. Although the parties
in the Vienna Convention cases may start with differing presumptions of whether the treaty
should be judicially enforceable, the briefs on both sides look to intent offramers and ratifiers,
as manifested both in treaty language and in the alternative remedies of political branch
enforcement. The issues of intent to create individually enforceable rights in both contexts
are quite similar, and it is difficult to say that treaties are getting treated much worse than
domestic federal statutes.
What is more, the factor I mentioned previously when discussing Vasan's views-whether
the claimant is seeking novel rights or disproportionate remedies-is frequently an implicit
and explicit concern in statutory as well as treaty cases. Consider, for example, Ranchos
Palos Verdes v. Abrams,4 in which a plaintiff sought to enforce through Section 1983 his
claim that the city had, in violation of the federal Telecommunications Act, refused to allow
him to build a radio tower on his property. The Act had fairly bare bones judicial review
provisions, and the plaintiff had enforceable individual rights thereunder. But the Court held
there was no congressional intent to make the statute enforceable through Section 1983,
which would have added on the heavy-handed remedies of damages and attorneys' fees for
a difficult land use decision.
Treaty maximalists might argue that such concern about discordant remedies have more
force when someone seeks damages and attorneys' fees than when someone raises a treaty
2 Sanchez.Llamas v. Oregon, No. 04-10566; Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05·51. The author joined an amicus brief
in support of the respondent in Bastillo.
3536 U.S. 273 (2002).
4544 U.S. 113 (2005).
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defensively in a criminal proceeding, as in the Vienna Convention cases. But too broad a
recognition of rights and remedies is a major concern in the criminal context-as may be
shown by other countries' not generally remedying violations of the Vienna Convention
within the criminal trial process.
To be sure, one might at first assume that the individual enforcement of consular notification
rights and remedies would fit well within our criminal procedure regime, where they have
a facial resemblance to the rights to be told of the availability of counsel under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. This resemblance, however, is more facial than real.
First, let me repair to my point that treaty maximalists want to equate treaties with
constitutional rights. In Sanchez-Llamas, the petitioner is arguing that Oregon's failure to
inform him of his right to consular notification should lead to the suppression of evidencea remedy analogous to that in Miranda, and one that we reserve principally for constitutional
violations rather than statutory ones. Similarly, the petitioner in Bustillo is arguing that a
similar violation of the Vienna Convention should be cognizable on habeas-a remedy that
again has generally been reserved for constitutional and not statutory defects. Indeed, Bustillo's further argument that the courts should ignore his procedural defaults would treat
Vienna Convention violations more favorably than most constitutional violations.
Second, even apart from the fact that the remedies proposed are more frequently used for
constitutional than statutory rights, the remedies that the defendants seek in the criminal
process may be disproportionate to the right they lost. There are important substantive
differences between Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and the Vienna Convention
right to consul. The exclusionary remedy requested in Sanchez-Llamas would be more
appropriate if the Vienna Convention right were one not to be interrogated without notice
of consular rights, which it is not.
Even putting aside an exclusionary remedy and having an inquiry into prejudice (as one
might have for an ineffective assistance claim under the Sixth Amendment) may not fit well
with the right. In the Sixth Amendment area, when courts ask whether a lawyer's nonfeasance
prejudiced the defendant, they have some benchmark for their inquiry. We assume that
attorneys act adversarily to the state, and follow reasonable professional standards. By
contrast, when the issue is lack of consular notification, and we look to what might have
happened had a consul been notified, there is no necessary adversariness nor a standard of
reasonable care against which to measure what might have been. Rather, we may have only
hindsight testimony of the vigorous efforts the consul would have made. Thus crafting an
appropriate remedy within our existing schemes may be difficult.
In conclusion, I would say that while we need not treat treaties worse than domestic
statutes, perhaps we need not treat them a lot better either. Rather, concerns that rights are
novel, or that remedies have a poor fit with violations, may be appropriate when courts
decide whether individuals should be able to enforce treaties in particular contexts without
further congressional action.
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